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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24

v

2, 11

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Respondent objects to Appellant's Statement of Issues.

The

Appellant's Statement of Issues fails to state issues but rather
simply contains argument on behalf of the Appellant. The issues in
this case are:
1)

Was the trial court correct in holding that there
were no genuine issues of material fact which would
preclude the granting of summary judgment?

2)

Was the trial court correct in holding that the
State Farm Homeowner's Insurance policy only
extended coverage to "accidents" and excluded
"intentional acts" of an insured?

3)

Was the trial court correct in holding that the
injuries sustained by Geary were the natural,
foreseeable, expected and anticipatory results of
Edwards' intended acts, thus precluding coverage?

4)

Was the trial court correct in holding that since
Edwards intended to do some harm to Geary he is
also held to have intended all harm actually
resulting
from his intentional act thereby
precluding coverage under the policy?

5)

Was the trial court correct in holding that an
intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law
from Edwards' acts?

6)

Was the trial court correct in considering Edwards'
guilty plea to aggravated assault to establish his
intent?

7)

Was the trial court correct in holding that
Edwards' claim that he acted in self-defense did
not change the nature of his intentional act?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment is appropriate when the record indicates
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v.
Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting
Kitchen v. Cal. Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied sub nom. Kitchen v. England, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992);
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.
P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

789

The appellate court will review the summary

judgment for correctness, without deferring to the trial court's
legal determinations. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989);
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a) in relevant part states:
(a) Brief of Appe11ant. The brief of the appellant
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated:
•• •

(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of
the proceedings, and its disposition in the court below.
A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented
for review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record. [Emphasis added.]

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal from Summary Judgment granted by the

Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Second District Court Judge, in a
declaratory action in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
("State Farm") and against Brandon Geary ("Geary") and Brad Edwards
("Edwards").

The declaratory action sought to determine the

insurance coverage, if any, afforded under a homeowner's insurance
policy issued to the parents of Edwards, for the intentional acts
of Edwards.
B.

Course of Proceedings:
Geary filed suit against Edwards and Christopher George

Orchard ("Orchard") on or about May 8, 1990, claiming that on or
about the 4th day of September, 1989, Edwards had discharged a
loaded shot gun in the direction of Edwards, striking him in the
chest and upper body area.
that the defendants

(See R. 4-5). The Complaint alleged

acted in a

"negligent manner",

"grossly

negligent manner with a reckless disregard for the safety and well
being of the plaintiff" and that the actions constituted "an
assault and batter [sic] upon the person of the plaintiff."

The

Complaint sought compensatory, special and punitive damages. This
lawsuit will hereinafter be referred to as "the underlying action."

3

On or about September 17, 1990, State Farm filed its complaint
seeking declaratory relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1,
et. seg., to determine whether coverage is afforded to Edwards,
under the homeowner's insurance policy issued to Edwards' parents,
for the acts alleged in the underlying lawsuit.
answer the declaratory action.

Edwards did not

A Notice of Intent to Default was

filed with the Court on April 9, 1991. Geary moved to intervene in
the declaratory action on behalf of Edwards.

The Court did not

rule on the Motion to Intervene.
Geary did appear and answered the petition for declaratory
relief.

Discovery proceeded.

On March 3, 1992, State Farm filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment, with supporting memorandum of points and authorities.
Geary opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Edwards did not

appear nor did he oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held
before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on July 7, 1992.
On July 8, 1992, Judge Cornaby issued his ruling granting
Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm.

An Order on the Summairy

Judgment was signed on July 22, 1992 by the Honorable Rodney S.
Page because Judge Cornaby had retired prior to having the Order
presented to him for signature.
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Geary filed an appeal in this matter on the 18th day of
August, 1992.
Order

On November 2, 1992, the Supreme Court entered an

transferring

this

case

to

the

Court

of

Appeals

for

disposition.
C.

Disposition of Trial Court:
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby granted State Farm's Motion for

Summary Judgment, finding that there were no issues of material
fact in dispute and that the acts of Edwards fell within the
exclusionary language of State Farm's homeowner's insurance policy.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The relevant facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Geary,
are:
1. On or about September 4, 1989, Edwards and Orchard were in
Edwards' car.

Edwards and Orchard had been dove hunting that

weekend, and were going to go dove hunting again near Syracuse,
Utah.

(Deposition of Brad Edwards, taken April 6, 1992, pages 6-

8.; hereinafter referred to as "Edwards' depo., pp.
2.
Sheets

".)

Edwards claims that a vehicle containing Geary and Troy
approached

the

Edwards

vehicle

(while

stopped

at

a

convenience store) and a confrontation arose. (Edwards' depo., pp.
8 and 9.)
3. The two vehicles then began chasing each other on roads in
the Syracuse area.

At one point the vehicles stopped and Edwards
5

told Geary that he would shoot him if Geary did not leave him
alone.
The

Edwards then got in his car and continued to drive away.

Geary

vehicle

continued

to

follow

the

Edwards vehicle.

(Edwards' depo., pp. 26, 27.)
4.

After driving some more, the vehicles stopped near an

intersection of two dirt roads in the Syracuse area.

(Edwards'

depo., pp. 9-26.)
5.

When the Edwards' vehicle came to a stop, Edwards

instructed Orchard to load his shotgun, which was located in the
front seat, with shotgun shells which were located in the back seat
of the vehicle.

(Edwards' depo., pp. 29-30, 52.)

6. Orchard, at Edwards' direction, reached into the back seat
of the car for shotgun shells and loaded the shotgun.

(Edwards'

depo., pp. 29-30, 52.)
7.

Edwards then grabbed the loaded shotgun from Orchard.

(Edwards' depo., pp. 28-30, 52.)
8.

Edwards then intentionally pointed the loaded shotgun in

the direction of Geary.

(Edwards' depo., pp. 28-30, 66; R. 199-

200.)
9.

Edwards told Geary to "Leave me alone or I'll shoot you."

Geary said, "You ain't going to shoot me" and started laughing.
(Edwards' depo., p. 30.)
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10.

Edwards then intentionally fired a shot in the direction

of Geary which struck the ground near Geary's vehicle.

(Edwards'

depo., page 30.)
11.

Edwards then intentionally fired a second shot in the

direction of Geary, while Geary was still sitting in his car. The
second shot struck Geary in the head, neck, and chest, with
approximately 132 pellets.

(Edwards' depo. pp. 31, 70; R. 199-

200.)
12. Edwards admitted that he intentionally fired the shotgun,
which he knew was loaded, in the direction of Geary but claims that
his intent was to frighten or scare Geary, not to shoot him.
(Edwards' depo., pp. 53, 76.)
13.

As a result of this incident, Edwards was arrested and

charged with attempted homicide.
charge of aggravated assault.

Edwards pled guilty to a lesser

(R. 49-56.)

14. As part of his plea, Edwards pled guilty to intentionally
causing serious bodily harm to Geary.
15.

(R. 50.)

Although Edwards claims that he told the court at the

time of sentencing that he had not intended to shoot Geary, this
claim cannot be substantiated.

A transcript of the hearing was

ordered in the case of State of Utah v. Brad Edwards, Case No.
891706590 FS.

Hal Reese, the court reporter on two of the three

hearings, had passed away. Other court reporters have reviewed the
7

notes taken by Hal Reese, but have not been able to decipher the
notes.
16.

(R. 68; Appellants Brief, p. 11.)
Based on Edwards' plea, he was sentenced to "zero to

five" years in custody.
his sentence.
17.

He actually served twenty-one months of

(Edwards' depo., p. 39.)

On or about September 17, 1990, State Farm filed this

declaratory action seeking to determine whether there was any
coverage afforded to Edwards, under the homeowner's insurance
policy issued to Edwards' parents, for the acts alleged in the
underlying lawsuit.
18.

(R. 3-9.)

Edwards did not answer the declaratory action. A Notice

of Intent to Default was filed with the Court on April 9, 1991.
Geary moved to intervene in the declaratory action on behalf of
Edwards.

The Court did not rule on the Motion to Intervene. (R.

23-24; R. 26-27.)
19.

Geary

did

declaratory relief.
20.

appear

and

answered

the

petition

for

(R. 17-19.)

On March 3, 1992 State Farm filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment, with supporting memorandum of points and authorities.
Geary opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Edwards did not

appear nor did he respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
42-58; R. 87-97.)
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(R.

21.

Oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment was held

before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on July 7, 1992.

(R. Ill,

205.)
22.

On July 8, 1992, Judge Cornaby issued his ruling granting

Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm.

An Order on the Summary

Judgment was signed on July 22, 1992, by the Honorable Rodney S.
Page because Judge Cornaby had retired prior to having the Order
presented to him for signature.
23.

(R. 199-200; R. 202-203.)

Geary filed an appeal in this matter on the 18th day of

August, 1992. Edwards has not appealed the Summary Judgment.

(R.

206.)
24.

On November 2, 1992, the Supreme Court entered an Order

transferring this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
(Addendum, Ex. 8.)
25.

State Farm sought to intervene in the underlying action

to present evidence concerning the intentional nature of Edwards'
acts.

The trial court denied State Farm's Motion to Intervene.

(Addendum, Ex. 5, 6, 7.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Appellant's brief fails to conform to the Rules of

Appellate Procedure by failing to properly cite to the record.
2.

Summary Judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
9

as a matter of law.

There are no material issues of fact in this

case and State Farm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3.

State Farm's homeowner's insurance policy only extends

coverage to "accidents".

Edwards' intentional shooting of his

shotgun in the direction of Geary was not an accident. Coverage is
therefore not extended by the homeowner's insurance policy.
4.

State

Farm's

homeowner's

insurance

policy

excludes

coverage to acts which cause bodily injury or property damage which
is either expected or intended by an insured, or which is the
result of willful and malicious acts of an insured.

The acts of

Brad Edwards caused bodily injury which was either expected or
intended by Mr. Edwards, or which was the result of willful and
malicious acts of Mr. Edwards.
5.

The acts of Brad Edwards were intentional acts causing

personal injury, thus precluding coverage.
6.

The acts of Brad Edwards could reasonably have expected

to cause personal injury, thus precluding coverage.
7.

The injuries sustained by Brandon Geary were naturally

foreseeable

consequences

of

the

acts

of

Brad

Edwards, thus

precluding coverage.
8.

The admission by Brad Edwards that he intended some harm

to Brandon Geary through his acts establishes, as a matter of law,
an intentional act, thus precluding coverage.
10

9.

The admission by Brad Edwards, in entering into the

guilty plea, establishes, as a matter of law, an intentional act,
thus precluding coverage.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPRT.T.ANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO CONFORM TO UTAH RULFS nv APPKT.T.ATK

AND MAY BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a) in relevant part
states:
(a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated: . . .
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the casef the course of
the proceedings, and its disposition in the court below.
A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented
for review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record.
The Statement of Facts of the Appellant's brief is not
supported by any citations to the record.
asserted without any support.

Facts are baldly

In Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746

P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987) the Utah Appellate Court stated:
If a party fails to make a concise statement of facts and
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are
supported, the court will assume the correctness of the
judgment below. [Citations omitted.] "This court need
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited
to, or supported by, the record." [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 1184.
11

Due to the Appellant's

failure in Koulis to support her

factual allegations by the proper citations to the record, the
Court disregarded the Appellant's Brief and assumed the correctness
of the judgment below.

Id. at 1185. See, also, Watson v. Watson,

190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1992), footnote 1;

and West

Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991.)
Due to Geary's failure to comply with the express requirements
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and in light of existing
case law, this Court should disregard Geary's brief in this matter.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE WHEN
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
AND THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B&A

Assoc, v. L.A. Young Sons Const.. 796 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1990);
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App. 1992);
and Transamerica Cash Reserve. Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc.,
789 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

The appellate court will review the

summary judgment for correctness, without deferring to the trial
court's legal determinations. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah
1989).

12

Geary cites to Brandt v. Sprinaville Baking Co., 353 P.2d 460
(Utah 1960) for the proposition that courts should be reluctant to
invoke the remedy of summary judgment.

However, even in light of

the Court's caution concerning granting summary judgment, the Court
in Brandt affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in that
matter.

Id. at 462.

Geary claims that material issues of fact exist which preclude
summary judgment.

He claims that factual issues exist as to

whether or not Edwards intended to shoot Geary and whether or not
Edwards' actions could be expected to cause bodily injury to the
Geary.

(Brief, page 8).

Geary claims that summary judgment,

therefore, in inappropriate.
State Farm disputes that material questions of fact exist.
Even when the uncontested

facts are viewed

in a light most

favorable to Geary, it is undisputed that:
1.

Edwards knew his shotgun was loaded at the time he

pointed it in the direction of Geary.

Edwards had specifically

asked Orchard to load the gun in response to the confrontation
between Geary and Edwards. Orchard was sitting next to Edwards and
Edwards saw him actually load the gun.
shells in it.
2.

He knew the gun had three

(Edwards' depo., pp. 52-53.)

When the gun was discharged, it was a result of Edwards

voluntary action, and intent, to fire the gun. The gun did not go
13

off by accident.
3*

(Edwards' depo., p. 52.)

Edwards aimed the gun out the window with the intention

of, at least, scaring the people in the other car.

(Edwards'

depo.# p. 53.)
4.

Edwards

intentionally

fired two shots; the first one

missing Geary and the second shot hitting Geary about the face,
neck and chest area.
5.

Edwards

(Edwards' depo., p. 70.)

plead

guilty to aggravated

assault,

a third

degree felony and signed a "Statement by Defendant in Advance of
Plea" wherein he stated:
4.
I understand that the elements of the
offense the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt are:
(1)

An attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another;
and

(2)

intentionally
causes
injury to another.

serious

bodily

These facts are viewed in the light most favorable and are not
in dispute.
In Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 601, 529 P.2d
1195 (1975), a case cited by Geary in support of his position, an
insured struck another student in the face and injured him.

The

assailant argued on appeal that the exclusion clause should not
apply because although he had intended to strike the other boy he
had not meant to hurt him.

In rejecting the claim that the claim
14

of the insured resulted in a material question of fact which must
go to the jury, the Court said:
The contention of young Clark that he did not intend to
injury Niemi does not make the question of intention an
issue of material fact which must go to the trier of
fact. Perhaps if Clark maintained that striking Niemi
was an accident, and that the blow itself was
unintentional, summary judgment would be improper due to
the dispute over a material fact. However, the act of
striking another in the face is one which we recognize as
an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm that
we can say a person who performed the act intended the
resulting harm, and his statement to the contrary does
nothing to refute that rule of law.
22 Ariz. App. at 602, 529 P.2d at 1196.
Although Edwards now claims that he did not intend to injure
Geary, only to scare him, those self-serving conclusions are not
determinative of the issues upon which the Court relied in reaching
its

conclusion

of

no

coverage.

Edwards

admits

that

he

intentionally pointed the gun in the direction of Geary, that he
knew the gun was loaded, and that he intentionally discharged the
gun.

Had he claimed the gun actually discharged, or that he did

not know the gun was loaded, perhaps a factual issue would be
created.

However, the admitted acts of aiming a loaded gun in the

direction of Geary, with knowledge of the fact that there are
shells in the chamber, and intentionally discharging the gun in the
direction of Geary establishes conduct which is so reasonably to
have been expected that "legal intent" is established as a matter
of law. See, for example, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 435 N.W.2d
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448 (Mich. App. 1988); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blanco. 804
P.2d 876 (Haw. 1990), and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cruse, 734 F.Supp.
1574 (N.D. Fla. 1989), discussed in more detail hereinafter.
POINT III
STATE FARM'S HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY
ONLY EXTENDS COVERAGE TO "ACCIDENTSw
AND EXCLUDES THE INTENTIONAL ACTS OF AN INSURED
State Farm had issued a homeowner's insurance policy to
Edwards' parents, under which Edwards

sought

coverage.

The

homeowner's insurance policy stated, in relevant part:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an
insured for damages because of bodily injury or property
damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an
occurrence, we will:
1.

pay up to the limit of liability for the damages
for which the insured is legally liable; and

2.

provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our
choice. •••

[Emphasis retained from policy].
The highlighted words which are defined in the policy.

The

term "occurrence" is defined:
"occurrence", when used in Section II (Liability Coverages) of
this policy, means an accident, including exposure to
conditions, which results in:
a.

bodily injury; or

b.

property damage

during the policy period.
Repeated or
continuous exposure to the same general
conditions is considered to be one occurrence.
(Emphasis retained from policy; underlining added).
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In order for there to be coverage for liability, an act must
be caused by an occurrence, "an accident"•

In Safeco Ins. Co. of

America v. Potts, 685 P.2d 632 (Wash. App. 1984), an insurer filed
a declaratory judgment action seeking determination that it had no
duty to defend its insured and no duty to pay any judgment rendered
against the insured in a personal injury action brought by an
administrator of an estate of an individual who died as a result of
a backhanded slap administered by the insured. The insured argued
that he made the slapping motion "to get Mr. McKee's attention" but
that he had no intention of injuring the deceased. The insured was
convicted of second degree manslaughter and second degree assault.
The Court, in citing from Johnson v. Business Assur. Co. of Am., 38
Wash.2d 245, 249, 228 P.2d 760 (1951) stated:
[T]o recover under a policy insuring against death or
injury by accidental means, (1) it is not enough that the
result was unusual, unexpected or unforeseen, but it must
appear that the means were accidental; and (2) accident
is never present when a deliberate act is performed,
unless some additional. unexpected, independent, and
unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings
about the result of injury or death.
685 P.2d

632, 633-34, (Emphasis retained).

Finding that the

backhanded slap was a "deliberate act", the Court held that even
though the result was not subjectively intended, the injury could
not be deemed to be "an accident".
In addition to requiring that the bodily injury be caused by
an accident, certain exclusion to coverage are also set forth in
the insurance policy.

The policy states, in relevant part:
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SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS
1. Coverage L (liability) and Coverage M (medicals) do
not apply to:
A.

bodily injury or property damage.

(1) Which is either expected or intended by an
insured or
(2) to any person or property which is the result
of willful and malicious acts of an insured.
(Underlining added.)
The shooting of Geary was an intentional act by Edwards. On
the day of the shooting, Edwards told Geary that he would shoot him
if Geary did not leave Edwards alone.

Edwards then instructed

Orchard, a passenger in his car, to load his shotgun.
Orchard

After

loaded the shotgun, Edwards took the gun from him,

intentionally

pointed

it

in

the

direction

of

Geary

and

intentionally fired a shot in Geary's direction.

Immediately

thereafter, Edwards

shot which

intentionally

fired

a

second

actually struck Geary in the head, neck and chest.

Geary was

struck with a 132 pellets from the shotgun blast.
Given the language of the policy, and the facts as admitted by
Edwards, coverage is not afforded by the policy.
Injuries which are the "Natural Foreseeable, Expected and
Anticipatory" Result of an Intentional Act Fall Within
the Intentional Act Exclusion
A number of cases have addressed the issue of whether the
intentional firing of a firearm constitutes conduct which falls
within the "intentional act" exclusion.
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In Allstate Ins, Co, v. Maloney, 435 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. App.
1988), the Plaintiff/insurer brought a declaratory judgment action
to determine its obligation to indemnify and defend its insured in
a lawsuit to recover for injuries sustained when the insured
allegedly fired a shotgun in the area where house guests were
located.

At issue was an intentional act exclusion which excluded

coverage for:
Any bodily injury or property damage which may be
reasonably expected to result from the intentional or
criminal act of an insured or which is in fact intended
by the insured person. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 449.
This exclusion is similar to the exclusion at issue in this
case.

The Maloney Court stated:

This court has ruled that a distinction should be made
between the terms "intentional" and "expected" when a
policy excludes coverage for intended or expected
injuries. [Citations omitted.] The Court in Jenkins
concluded that in order to avoid liability for an
expected injury it must be shown that the injury was the
natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result of
an intentional act. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 450.
The trial court granted the Insurer's Motion for Summary
Disposition and the Michigan Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court's decision.

The Maloney Court held:

We conclude that Spicer's injuries could reasonably have
been expected to result from Fisher's intentional act of
shooting a shotgun where Spicer was located. Even if
Fisher did not intend to injure, or even hit, Spicer,
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Spicer's injuries were nevertheless the natural,
foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result of Fisher's
acts.
. . . Because Fisher could have reasonably
expected injury to result from his intentional act# the
policy exclusion applies. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 450.

See, also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d

734, 743, (Mich. 1989).
In reviewing the acts of Edwards, therefore, the Court should
consider whether the injuries sustained by Geary were the natural,
foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result of Edwards' acts.
The trial court in this case recognized and applied the
"natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipatory result" principal
of law in its Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusions,
and Decree where it states:
Even if Mr. Edwards had not "intended" to hit Mr. Geary,
he could have "expected" that it would happen considering
his intentional actions.
(Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusions and Decree,
attached

in Addendum,

determined
resulted

Ex. 2.)

The trial

that Edwards' intentional

court

correctly

shooting of the shotgun

in personal injury to Geary which was the natural,

foreseeable, expected or anticipatory result of Edwards' acts.
Coverage for the acts, therefore, was properly denied.
Under the Majority Rule an Intentional Act Exclusion
Applies if the Insured Intended to do a Particular Act,
and Intended to do Some Harm, Even if the Harm Actually
Done was Radically Different from that Intended
Many courts, considering whether the intentional act exclusion
applies when an insured denies intent to do specific harm, have
20

focused consideration on whether the insured, in performing an
intentional act, meant to do any harm.
In Allstate Ins. Co, v. Steinemer, 723 P.2d 873 (11th Cir.
1984), a case cited by Geary in support of his position, the 11th
Circuit held:
Under the majority rule [an intentional injury exclusion]
applies if the insured intended to do a particular act,
and intended to do some harm, even if the harm actually
done was radically different from that intended.
(Emphas is added.)
Id. at 875.
In the present case, Edwards has testified that he did not
intend to actually shoot Geary. Although Edwards had threatened to
shoot Geary, had fired a "warning shot in his direction", and later
plead guilty to doing an intentional act

(for which he was

incarcerated for twenty-one months) Edwards now claims that he only
intended to scare Geary by intentionally shooting a loaded shotgun
in his direction.
An intent to scare is an intent to bring some harm to the
victim.

The fact that the harm actually done, personal injuries

resulting from gunshot wounds, is radically different from the harm
intended does not remove the act from an intentional injury
exclusion.

In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cruse, 734 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D.

Fla. 1989), the intentional act exclusion at issue was the same as
that found in Maloney, supra.

In Cruse, the plaintiff/insurer
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requested a declaration of non-coverage in connection with shooting
deaths caused by its insured.
Florida

granted

Judgment.

the

The United States District Court of

plaintiff/insurer's

Motion

for

Summary

The insured testified that his only intention was to

scare the victims and show them that he meant business.
insured testified he did not have any intent to injure.

The

However,

the Federal District Court of Florida held:
Mr. Cruse's admission that he wanted to scare the victims
indicates that he intended some harm to them. The fact
that the harm may have been greater than he intended,
does' not warrant coverage under the policy. ... In this
light, Mr. Cruse's admission that he started the events
in question with a desire to scare people compels this
court to conclude that, as in Landis and Zordan, it is
inevitable for some type of harm to flow from the
behavior at issue here, i.e., trying to scare strangers
by pointing a gun at them in a threatening manner.
Therefore, based on these findings, the court finds that
the intentional acts exclusion in this case bars coverage
under the policy.
Id. at 1581.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v.
Blanco, 804 P.2d 876 (Haw. 1990) was faced with a fact pattern
which it characterized as follows:
Given the best possible interpretation, Garcia [the
insured] fired the rifle in Saturnino's direction
intending to frighten him. That physical injury might
result from such an action is certainly something which
a reasonable man in Garcia's position should have
anticipated and expected.
Id. at 881.
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The Hawaii Supreme Court used the same reasoning as Maloney
that injuries can be naturally expected from shooting a loaded gun
in the direction of another person and, therefore, fall within the
intentional injury exclusion.

The Blanco Court held that even

though Blanco's only intent was to frighten the victim, the intent
to cause bodily harm is present as a matter of law.
Garcia could not reasonably expect to be covered or
defended with respect to injuries to Saturnino which
arose from his intentionally firing a rifle in
Saturnino's direction to frighten him even though the
particular injury was unexpected.
Id. at 881.
Geary's own case law cites the majority position that a person
who does an intentional act and intends some harm is also held to
have intended all of the resulting harm, even if the actual harm is
radically different from the harm intended. Cruse and Blanco both
hold that an insured who intentionally fires a loaded gun at the
direction of the victim with an intent to frighten also has the
intent to inflict all other actual harm including personal injuries
from the shooting.
Edwards' testimony that he intended to scare Geary and,
therefore, intentionally fired a loaded gun in Geary's direction,
amounts to an affirmation that he intended actual harm or injuries
to Geary.

The fact that the injuries sustained were allegedly
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greater than anticipated does not remove the intentional nature of
the act nor does it invoke insurance coverage for such acts.
Intent to Injure can be Inferred as a Matter of Law
In Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Smith, 376 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App.
1985), the Minnesota Appellate Court was faced with interpreting an
intentional act exclusion which precluded coverage for "bodily
injury or property damage expected or intended by an insured
person."

(Emphasis in original.)

Id. at 508.

The insured drove

to the victim's house and fired four shots from a pistol at the
lower level of the house.

The insured testified his only intent

was to scare the occupants of the house.

Further, the insured

claimed that he purposely fired at the darkened lower level of the
house

in order

to

avoid

the

lighted

possibility of injuring someone.

area upstairs

and the

However, the insured's shots

killed one of the residents of the house.
In light of the insured's testimony and the absence of any
other evidence showing subjective intent by the insured to injure
the victim, the Minnesota Appellate Court found that there was no
proof of actual intent.

However, the Court found legal intent as

a matter of law.
The record is void of any evidence that [the insured] had
actual intent to inflict injury. Shooting into a house
known to be occupied by people, however, is an egregious
act, and intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of
law.
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Id. at 510.

On this finding the Minnesota Appellate Court upheld

the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the
insurer in a declaratory judgment action.

(See, also. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co. v. Victor, 442 N.W.2d 880, 882-883 (Neb. 1979).
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. King, 851 F.2d 1369 (11th
Cir. 1988) the insured testified that his intent in shooting at the
victim's vehicle was only to "shoot out the tires". However, one
of the victims died as a result of a bullet wound. The intentional
act exclusion in King is exactly the same as in the present case.
In upholding the trial court's granting of the insurer's summary
judgment, the 11th Circuit pointed to case law which held that
intent to injure can be inferred as a matter of law.

See,

Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn.
1976); Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins., 306 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1981);
and Smith, supra.
After recognizing the rule that intent to injure may be
inferred as a matter of law the 11th Circuit accepted the trial
court's finding that:
... From all the evidence [the insureds] intent to do
injury was clearly present.
Id. at 1371.
The King Court concluded by stating:
Based on the evidence, the District Court could have
reasonably concluded that King either expected or
intended the resulting bodily injury. Therefore, the
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District Court's Declaratory Judgment that State Farm is
not obligated to defend or indemnify King is affirmed.
Id. at 1372.
The Case Law Cited in Geary's Brief Is Distinguishable
From the Issues Before this Court
The legal authorities cited by Geary regarding the appropriate
manner

of

interpreting

the

intentional

act

exclusion

are

inapplicable to the present action for a variety of reasons.
First, almost all of the cases cited by Geary interpret a different
intentional act exclusion than the one at issue in this case. The
exclusions relied on by Geary focuses solely on the "intentional"
nature of the act of the insured. The intentional act exclusion of
the State Farm Policy at issue in this matter, set forth above,
states that coverage for liability and medical coverage is not
afforded for bodily injury or property damage "which is either
expected or intended by an insured".

This exclusion (including

"expected or intended") is broader than the exclusion relied on by
Geary.
The authorities cited by Geary deal only with intentional act
exclusions where the only acts excluded from coverage are those
which

are

"intended"

by

the

insured.

The

intentional

act

exclusions at issue in the authorities cited by Geary do not, for
the most part, deal with injury "expected" (or, "reasonably to be
expected") by the insured.

See Safeco Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 817
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P.2d 861, 863 (Wash. App. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steinemer,
723 F.2d 873, 875 (11th Cir. 1984) (Ariz. App. 1975); Fire Ins.
Exchange v. Berrav, 694 P.2d 259, 260 (Ariz. App. 1983); and Clark
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 529 P.2d 1195, 1996 (Ariz. App. 1975.)
Contrary to the position taken by Geary, a careful reading of
many of the cases cited by him actually support State Farm's
position

that

coverage

is

not

afforded

under

the

factual

circumstances of this case. For example, in Steinemer, supra, the
11th Circuit held:
Under the majority rule the [intentional act exclusion]
applies if the insured intended to do a particular act,
and intended to do some harm, even if the harm actually
done was radically different from that intended.
(Emphas is added.)
Id. at 875.
In Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray, 694 P.2d 259 (Ariz. App.
1983), while holding that the intentional act was covered since the
insured

acted

in

self-defense,

the

Arizona

Appellate

Court

nevertheless found:
We find in this case that only one inference can be drawn
from Berrayfs testimony. The action of intentionally
aiming a gun known to be loaded, at a person at close
range and intentionally firing it is an act so certain to
cause harm that it must be said, as a matter of law, that
the person pulling the trigger intended the resulting
harm despite his statements to the contrary.
Id. at 261.x
x

The Arizona Appellate Court recognized that Division Two of
the Arizona Court of Appeals, in Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 119
Ariz. 150, 579 P.2d 1120 (App. 1978), has specifically reached a
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Edwards intentionally pointed a gun, known to be loaded, at
Geary and intentionally fired in his direction.

He had specific

intent to, at least, scare Geary. His act was so certain to cause
harm that it must be said, as a matter of law, that Edwards
intended the resulting harm despite his present statements to the
contrary.
Clark v. Allstate Insurance Company, 529 P.2d 1195 (Ariz. App.
1975), also cited by the Plaintiff, is a case where one young man
struck another young man in the face which resulted in injuries.
The young man who threw the punch testified that he did not intend
to cause any injuries.

The Arizona Appellate Court held the

contention of Clark that he did not intend to injure Niemi did not
make the question of intention an issue of material fact which
"must go to the trier of fact".

The Court found that striking

someone in the face is an act so certain to cause harm that it must
be said, as a matter of law, that the person throwing the punch
intended the resulting harm.

Id. at 1196.

In addition to interpreting different exclusionary language in
the policy, some of the cases cited by Geary are otherwise readily

contrary result and has held that intentional acts of self-defense
were within the exclusion and no coverage would be afforded. The
Berray court also held that "[a] narrow and literal interpretation
of the term "intentional acts" would lead to the application of the
exclusion in these circumstances. However, on closer analysis, it
would appear that Berray is entitled to at least a defense by the
insurance company." 694 P.2d 259, 261. State Farm did provide a
defense to Edwards in the underlying action.
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distinguishable from the present case on their own facts.

In

Vanoard Ins, Co, v, Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. App. 1972), for
example,

the

trial

court

found

that

the

defendant

did

not

intentionally shoot and injure the plaintiff based partially on the
fact that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to form the
requisite intent for such a finding.

Id. at 965.

POINT IV
EDWARDS' PLEA OF GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
ESTABLISHES INTENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Edwards' Plea of Guilty to Aggravated Assault
Could Have Been Relied Upon as the Sole Basis for Granting
Summary Judgment in This Matter
Edwards has argued in his brief that his plea to aggravated
assault was not determinative of the issue of intent.

The trial

court's ruling shows that Edwards' plea was not the only basis, nor
the primary basis, upon which

summary

judgment was

granted.

However, a granting of summary judgment still would have been
proper even if the trial court had relied solely upon Edwards'
guilty plea as a basis for granting summary judgment.

(A copy of

Edwards' plea is attached in the addendum.)
In relevant part, Edwards' plea states:
4. I understand that the elements of the offense that
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are:
(1) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,
to do bodily injury to another; and
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(b) intentionally cause serious bodily injury to
another.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the "Representations to the Court"
section of Edwards' plea states:
6. My decision to enter this plea was made after full
and careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with
a full understanding of my rights, the facts and
circumstances of the case and consequences of the plea.
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication,
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was
made, and I am not now under the influences of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants.
7.

I have no mental reservations concerning the plea.

The plea was signed by Edwards.
The terms of this guilty plea are clear and unambiguous.
Edwards pled guilty to intentionally causing serious bodily harm to
Geary.
In Hooks v. Middlebrooks, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 54 (A.D. 4 Dept. 1984)
the Defendant in a civil action had previously been charged with a
felony and ultimately pled guilty to a class "A" misdemeanor. The
New York Appellate Court recognized that the Defendant had been
represented by counsel and had been explained the ramifications of
entering the plea and had adequate time to come to a thoughtful
decision. Under these circumstances, the New York Appellate Court
held that the guilty plea in the criminal action was determinative
of the issues addressed by the plea.
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Similarly, in Merchants Mut. Ins. Co, v. Arzillo, 472 N.Y.S.
2d 97 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1984), the New York Appellate Court held that
where a defendant in a civil action had previously pled guilty to
arson, a plea that was voluntarily entered by the defendant and
adequately explained by the Court, had collaterally estopped the
defendant from litigating the issue of willful responsibility for
the fire in the civil suit.
Therefore, even if the trial court had relied solely upon
Edwards' plea of guilty to aggravated assault, summary judgment
would have proper in this matter.
Edwards' Plea of Guilty to Aggravated Assault was
Properly Considered by the Trial Court and Properly
Used as a Basis for Granting Summary Judgment
Edwards' Guilty Plea is Admissible as Admission
Against Interest
A review of the trial court's Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment, Conclusions, and Decree, (attached in Addendum) shows
that the trial court used Edwards' plea of guilty to aggravated
assault as one consideration, among many, in granting State Farm's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Pleas to criminal charges arising

from the same transaction as a later civil suit are clearly
admissible as admissions against interest and can be used as
evidence of intent in the subsequent civil action.

See New York

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Doty, 794 P.2d 521, 524 (Wash. App. 1990);
and Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. McGrath, 708 P.2d 657, 660-61
(Wash. App. 1985).

In making its decision, the trial court
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properly pointed to Edwards' guilty plea as evidence of Edwards'
intent in the present action.
Geary argues in his brief that the trial court in the criminal
action may actually have accepted a plea of guilty to aggravated
assault, not on the express terms of the written plea, but on some
other basis.

This argument was not raised to the trial court in

this action and, therefore, was not decided on by the trial court.
(A copy of Geary's Memorandum in Opposition to State Farm's Motion
for Summary Judgment is attached as part of the Addendum.)
As correctly pointed out by Geary, there is no transcript of
the hearing at which Edwards' plea was entered. Judge Page's court
reporter passed away before a transcript of the hearing was made
and other court reporters were not able to produce a transcript
pursuant

to the notes

left by Judge Page's

court

reporter.

Therefore, the only official record of the proceeding at which the
guilty plea was entered is a copy of the guilty plea itself.
By the express terms of the guilty plea, Edwards pled guilty
to intentionally causing serious bodily injury to Geary.
Extrinsic Evidence is not Admissible to Change the
Meaning of an Official Court Document
Geary has argued that Judge Page may have accepted his plea of
guilty, not under the express terms of the document memorializing
his plea, but rather under a different interpretation of the plea
wherein he did not admit to intentionally causing bodily harm to
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Geary. Case law is clear in holding that extrinsic evidence cannot
be used to change or construe the meaning of an unambiguous
official court document.

"As a general rule, where a court's

decree is clear and unambiguous, neither pleadings, findings, nor
matters outside the record may be used to change its meaning or
construe it."

State ex rel. Moore v. Scroqqie, 704 P.2d 364, 369

(Idaho App. 1985).

See, also, Evans v. Jensen, 655 P.2d 454, 460

(Idaho App. 1982); Parks v. Parks, 574 P.2d 588 (N.M. 1978); and
Lemon v. Hall, 640 P.2d 929 (N.M. 1982).
Geary's attempt to use Edwards' later deposition testimony to
contradict or vary the terms of the written plea should not be
allowed by this Court.

There is no ambiguity in the plea which

justifies the use of extrinsic evidence.
Paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of Edwards' plea, supra, concerning the
intentional nature of Edwards' acts are clear and unambiguous.
Further,

Edwards

indicates

that

he

had

been

fully

advised

concerning the nature and consequences of the plea and that he had
understood and had no mental reservations concerning this plea.
Under the applicable case law, this plea must stand as the official
court decree concerning Edwards' plea and extrinsic evidence which
would change the meaning of this plea cannot be considered.
Therefore, Edwards' plea must be accepted on its face, and
there is no factual question concerning the meaning of this plea.
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POINT V
EDWARDS' CLAIM THAT HE SHOT GEARY IN SELF-DEFENSE
DOES NOT MAKE THE INTENTIONAL INJURY EXCLUSION
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE
Geary has cited one case, Fire Ins, Exchange v. Berray, 694
P.2d 259 (Ariz. App. 1983) for the proposition that an intentional
shooting done in the context of self-defense does not fall within
an intentional injury exclusion.2
The Court in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Marshall. 554 So.2d
504 (Fla. 1989) was faced with a situation where an insured who
allegedly feared for his life attempted to discourage an attacker
by holding up a wooden clubf then shooting a warning shot from his
pistol, and finally hitting the attacker in the head with a gun
which discharged upon impact and injured the attacker. The insurer
filed a declaratory action seeking to determine its obligations
under his homeowner's policy which included an intentional injury
exclusion which excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property
damage which is expected or intended by an insured".
The Florida

Supreme Court held that the

Id. at 505.

fact that the

insured's acts occurred in self-defense did not negate the

2

As mentioned above, another Division in Arizona's Appellate
Court reached a contrary conclusion, in Lockhart v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 119 Ariz.App. 150, 579 P.2d 1120 (App. 1978).
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intentional nature of those acts and, therefore, fell within the
intentional injury exclusion.
... Such acts of self-defense are undeniably intentional
and have been held to be embraced within the intentional
act exclusions by a majority of courts. [Citations
omitted.]
We align ourselves with a majority of jurisdictions,
which hold that self-defense is not an exception to the
intentional acts exclusion and the clear terms of the
policy control.
In such cases, the sanctity of the
parties to freely contract prevails. ... (Emphasis
added.)
Id. at 505. The majority of courts which have held that a claim of
self-defense is not an exception to an intentional act exclusion
include: Western World Ins. Co. v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co.. 600
F.Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1984); Home Ins. Co. v. Nielsen, 332 N.E.2d 240
(Ind. App. 1975); Heshelman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 412
N.E.2d 301 (Ind. App. 1980); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v.
Krekeler, 363 F.Supp. 354 (E.D. Mo. 1973)/ rev'd on other grounds,
491 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.); Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 201
F.Supp. 647 (M.D. N.C. 1962); Clemmons v. American States Ins. Co.,
412 So.2d 906 (Fla. App. D5 1982); Eubanks v. Nationwide Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. App. 1990); Century Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Paddock, 425 N.W.2d 214 (Mich. App. 1988); and Economy Fire
and Cas. Co. v. Iverson, 445 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989).
In Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 123 (Wash. 1989), the
Washington Appellate Court joined with a majority of courts in
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holding that a claim of self-defense is not an exception to an act
otherwise

falling

within

homeowners policy.

an

intentional

act

exclusion

of a

In reaching this decision, the Washington

Supreme Court reviewed the rationale of minority courts in holding
that an act of self-defense did not fall within an intentional
injury exclusion.

Id. at 126-128.

In rejecting the reasoning of

minority courts in finding that an act of self-defense is an
exception to an intentional act exclusion in an insurance policy
the Washington Supreme Court addressed the same issues as the
Florida Supreme Court in Marshall and recognized that the clear
terms of the policy exclusion control and the sanctity of parties
to freely contract must prevail in these cases.
Thus, Geary's contention that Edwards' intentional shooting
was allegedly in self-defense and, therefore, not subject to the
intentional injury act must fail as a matter of law.
POINT VI
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN THE UNDERLYING TRIAL
After being

granted

summary

judgment

in the declaratory

action, State Farm moved to intervene in the underlying personal
injury action between Geary and Edwards.

State Farm sought to

introduce evidence that the shooting of Geary was an intentional
act of Edwards.
declaratory

State Farm's position was that, given the

action,

Geary

would
36

not

seek

to

establish

the

intentional nature of the act since a finding of an intentional act
would preclude insurance coverage to Edwards
"fund" from which to pursue collection).

(resulting in no

The attorney hired by

State Farm certainly would not attempt to establish an intentional
act by Edwards due to his representation of Mr. Edwards.
Geary opposed State Farm's Motion to Intervene. State Farm's
Motion to Intervene was ultimately denied by the trial court.
That portion of Geary's brief dealing with the decision
reached by the jury in the underlying action is misleading.

The

issues of the intentional nature of Edwards' actions were not
litigated.

Geary moved the Court, at the conclusion of the

evidence, to dismiss the claim for an intentional tort.

(See

Brief, pp. 13-14.)
CONCLUSION
State

Farm's

homeowner's

insurance

policy

only

affords

coverage to "occurrences" (i.e., "accidents") which are neither
expected nor intended by an insured.

Edwards' intentional act of

taking a loaded shotgun, which he knew to be loaded, aiming it in
the direction of Geary and intentionally discharging the shotgun in
the direction of Geary, was an act which was either expressly
intended by Edwards, or was an act which resulted in personal
injury which was reasonably to be expected. The injuries sustained
by Geary were the natural, foreseeable, expected and anticipatory
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results of the intentional act. Although Edwards now claims that
he did not intend to injure Geary, the nature of the actsf together
with his previous admissions and his expressed intent to "scare"
Geary is sufficient to establish intent as a matter of law.

The

trial court correctly entered summary judgment on behalf of State
Farm.
DATED this

day of January, 1993.
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DANIEL D. ANDERSEN
Attorneys for State Farm
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